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This is a critical time to review the core of our
nation’s safety net for families with children.
Congress will have to reauthorize the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program
before funding runs out at the end of 2010. Yet,
despite intensive research at TANF’s inception, we
know surprisingly little about its recent evolution.
The recession has raised fundamental questions
about how to conduct an effective work-focused
assistance program and how TANF fits into the
broad array of safety net programs. At the same
time, there may be lessons in how states have
responded to staggeringly high budget deficits as
well as to the funding and policy opportunities
offered them through the federal stimulus package.
To learn more, the Urban Institute convened
a roundtable meeting with experts from the federal
and state governments, research institutions, and
the advocacy community for a broad-ranging dis-
cussion (box 1). We began by establishing a shared
understanding of recent trends in the TANF pro-
gram, including caseloads, state program rules, and
the characteristics of families served by the pro-
gram. The group sought to identify lessons learned
from the recession—perhaps the greatest test of
the program since it began—and concluded with
ideas for the future of TANF, as well as insights
and perspectives on the upcoming congressional
reauthorization.
Although the participants expressed a wide
range of perspectives and opinions, shared themes
dominated the conversation. These included a
broad discussion of TANF program goals, espe-
cially of finding the right balance between TANF’s
dual roles as a work program and a basic assis-
tance program that provides a safety net for
struggling families. Participants also had a lively
discussion of the TANF work participation rate
requirements, questioning the right way to main-
tain a focus on work without promoting unpro-
ductive responses from states. Program funding
was another theme, including whether funding
should automatically adjust during periods of
high unemployment or inflation and how much
flexibility states should be given. Another theme
covered TANF’s role in the safety net.
State TANF Programs Today
The TANF program looks considerably different
now than it did when welfare reform first rolled
out in 1997. Far fewer families receive cash assis-
tance, and many households that receive assis-
tance do not include a qualifying adult. State
programs differ significantly in the proportion of
families served and even in whether caseloads have
increased at all during this recession. In total,
states use more TANF dollars for nonassistance
purposes, such as emergency help and child care
subsidies, than for cash assistance.
Caseloads. Caseloads have declined dramati-
cally since TANF replaced Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) (figure 1),1 though
reductions vary dramatically across states. Some
(Alaska, D.C., Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana,
Wyoming) experienced more than a 75 percent
drop, while others (Arizona, Indiana, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Oregon, Tennessee) saw less than
a 20 percent decline. Researchers note several
reasons for the decline, including more single
mothers joining the workforce and fewer eligible
families choosing to participate in TANF, given
its low benefits and strict rules about entry and
work participation (Blank 2002). State partici-
pants and national observers at the roundtable
echoed many of these findings. 
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BOX 1. Urban Institute TANF Roundtable Attendees
Participants
Gregory Acs, Senior Fellow, The Urban Institute.
Gordon Berlin, President, MDRC.
Douglas J. Besharov, Professor, Welfare Reform Academy, Maryland School of Public Policy.
Kevin Concannon, Under Secretary for Food, Nutrition and Consumer Services, USDA.
Judy Conti, Federal Advocacy Coordinator, National Employment Law Project.
Michelle Derr, Senior Researcher, Mathematica Policy Research Inc.
Peter Edelman, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
Gene Falk, Domestic Social Policy Division, Congressional Research Service.
Olivia Golden, Institute Fellow, The Urban Institute.
Naomi Goldstein, Director, Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation,
Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Larry Goolsby, Director of Legislative Affairs, American Public Human Services Association.
Mark Greenberg, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Celia Hagert, Senior Policy Analyst, Center for Public Policy Priorities, Texas.
Heather Hahn, Education, Workforce, and Income Security, U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Ron Haskins, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies; Codirector, Center on Children and Families, 
The Brookings Institution.
Howard Hendrick, Director, Oklahoma Department of Human Services.
Cliff Johnson, Executive Director, Institute for Youth, Education, and Families, National League of Cities.
Avis Jones-Deweever, Director, Research, Public Policy and Information Center for African American
Women, National Council of Negro Women.
Julie Kerksick, Administrator, Division of Family and Economic Security, Wisconsin Department of Children
and Families.
Pamela Loprest, Senior Fellow, Income and Benefits Policy Center, The Urban Institute.
Elizabeth Lower-Basch, Senior Policy Analyst, Center for Law and Social Policy.
Karin Martinson, Senior Research Associate, The Urban Institute.
Nicole Mason, Assistant Research Professor, Executive Director, Women of Color Policy Network, 
Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University.
Helen Mitchell, Director of Strategic Planning and Policy Development, Office of Representative 
Danny K. Davis, U.S. House of Representatives.
Robert Moffitt, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Economics, Johns Hopkins University.
Emma Oppenheim, Manager, Workforce Development Initiatives, National Council of La Raza.
Sharon Parrott, Counselor to the Secretary for Human Services Policy, Department of Health and 
Human Services.
Donna Pavetti, Director, Welfare Reform and Income Support Division, Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities.
Howard Rolston, Principal Associate, Abt Associates Inc.
Deborah Schlick, Executive Director, Affirmative Options Coalition, Minnesota.
Margaret Simms, Institute Fellow, The Urban Institute.
Douglas Steiger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislation (Human Services), U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services.
Sheri Steisel, Federal Affairs Counsel and Senior Committee Director, National Conference of State
Legislatures.
Margery Austin Turner, Vice President for Research, The Urban Institute.
Michael L. Wiseman, Research Professor of Public Policy and Economics, George Washington Institute of
Public Policy.
Sheila Zedlewski, Director, Income and Benefits Policy Center, The Urban Institute.
Observers
Douglas Call, Research Associate, Welfare Reform Academy, Maryland School of Public Policy.
Brendan Kelly, Senior Social Science Research Analyst, Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation,
Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Elizabeth Laird, Institute for Policy Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
Michael Laracy, Director, Policy Reform and Advocacy, Annie E Casey Foundation.
Jessica LePak, Legislative Fellow, National Congress of American Indians.
Inessa Lurye, Program Analyst, Health and Human Services, Government of the District of Columbia.
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BOX 1. (continued)
Emily Schmitt, Research Fellow, Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation, Administration for Children
and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Shelley Waters Boots, Annie E Casey Foundation.
Urban Institute
Ajay Chaudry, Center Director, Center on Labor, Human Services, and Population.
Karina Fortuny, Research Associate.
Jim Kaminski, Research Assistant.
Serena Lei, Research Writer and Editor.
Sarah Minton, Research Associate.
Mary Murphy, Research Associate.
Caroline Ratcliffe, Senior Research Associate.
Gretchen Rowe, Research Associate.
Alexandra Stanczyk, Research Assistant.
FIGURE 1.  Trends in Welfare Caseloads, 1980–2008
Sources: HHS-TANF (2006); HHS-ACF files at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/caseload/caseload_current.htm.
Notes: Starting from 2000, AFDC/TANF families include families in separate state programs. Shaded areas indicate periods of recession.
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Since the recession began in December 2007,
caseloads reversed this trend in 30 states but
remained steady or continued to fall in others
through 2008 (the latest administrative data avail-
able). An Urban Institute web survey of state
TANF administrators, conducted in October
2009, found that about two-thirds of responding
states (16 out of 24) saw caseloads increase as the
recession deepened.
The characteristics of families receiving cash
assistance also have changed. Nearly half (46 per-
cent) receive cash assistance only for the children
because the parent is absent or ineligible—for
example, a noncitizen parent or a parent receiving
disability benefits from Supplemental Security
Income (SSI)—or has been sanctioned for not
complying with some program rule. In some states
(Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana),
child-only assistance makes up about three-
quarters or more of the caseload (table 1).
Fewer poor families receive assistance today
than when TANF began. In 1996, an estimated
44 percent of poor families with children received
assistance (Zedlewski, Holcomb, and Duke
1998). In 2008, 30 percent of poor families with
children received cash benefits. Again, the range
varies dramatically across the states from only 
4 percent of poor families receiving assistance in
Wyoming to more than 73 percent in California.
State programs and policy choices. For TANF,
states choose their own benefit levels and entry and
work participation requirements. In 30 states, the
maximum TANF benefit pays 30 percent or less of
the federal poverty level (figure 2). Forty-two states
now use formal diversion strategies to direct fami-
lies away from the welfare rolls (table 2). Those
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Change in Change in
December caseload caseload Child-only Poor families 
2008 1997–2008 December 2007– units on TANF
caseload (FY average, %) December 2008 (%) (FY 2008, %) (FY 2008, %)
U.S. totala 1,763,397 -47 3 46 30
Alabama 18,476 -36 -1 49 16
Alaska 2,821 -75 -6 33 39
Arizona 38,171 -14 3 51 30
Arkansas 8,664 -59 -1 44 11
California 515,698 -22 8 46 73
Colorado 8,507 -71 -6 50 12
Connecticut 16,570 -45 -15 44 50
Delaware 4,482 -59 12 61 34
Dist. of Columbia 5,726 -78 9 42 47
Florida 54,064 -64 11 78 16
Georgia 21,743 -74 -4 87 11
Hawaii 6,862 -70 4 26 49
Idaho 1,600 -77 5 92 5
Illinois 19,572 -90 -5 81 9
Indiana 40,952 -9 32 28 25
Iowa 18,878 -13 -4 28 41
Kansas 12,193 -21 -5 31 28
Kentucky 29,917 -42 2 60 26
Louisiana 10,502 -76 -5 74 9
Maine 13,042 -13 7 19 54
Maryland 22,606 -56 10 41 35
Massachusetts 63,544 -5 21 30 67
Michigan 64,169 -43 -7 33 32
Minnesota 20,875 -57 -21 44 35
Mississippi 11,501 -63 -1 54 11
Missouri 37,725 -32 -3 25 31
Montana 3,440 -56 8 43 17
Nebraska 8,218 -27 9 44 31
Nevada 7,853 -21 6 45 18
New Hampshire 5,531 -28 23 48 35
New Jersey 33,203 -54 -3 31 31
New Mexico 15,123 -52 24 41 28
New York 150,491 -48 -3 38 42
North Carolina 25,353 -68 3 70 12
North Dakota 2,291 -52 11 28 20
Ohio 86,271 -44 7 54 35
Oklahoma 8,639 -64 -4 65 10
TABLE 1. Characteristics of the TANF Caseload
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FIGURE 2. Maximum TANF Benefit for a Family of Three, 1996 versus 2008
Source: The Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database, funded by DHHS/ACF and DHHS/ASPE, http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/WDRWelcome.cfm.
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Maximum benefit as a percentage of the federal poverty level
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2008
Oregon 23,353 8 21 40 30
Pennsylvania 46,663 -68 -16 40 25
Rhode Island 8,064 -58 -3 32 54
South Carolina 16,889 -45 17 49 15
South Dakota 2,980 -28 3 70 21
Tennessee 58,329 -3 6 32 38
Texas 50,447 -68 -11 70 9
Utah 5,849 -47 14 53 15
Vermont 3,031 -43 -29 33 45
Virginia 33,276 -32 7 36 27
Washington 58,144 -26 12 39 52
West Virginia 9,301 -70 7 53 19
Wisconsin 17,809 -47 0 69 22
Wyoming 281 -89 6 73 4
TABLE 1.    (continued)
Sources: Caseload data were obtained from HHS-ACF files at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/caseload/caseload_current.htm. The number of poor families was obtained from table
C17010 of the 2008 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates at http://factfinder.census.gov/.
Note: Starting from 2000, AFDC/TANF families include families in separate state programs.
a. Data from Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands were included in calculations for the U.S. total, except for the percentage of poor families on TANF.
Change in Change in
December caseload caseload Child-only Poor families 
2008 1997–2008 December 2007– units on TANF
caseload (FY average, %) December 2008 (%) (FY 2008, %) (FY 2008, %)
U.S. totala 1,763,397 -47 3 46 30
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Job search Reduction in Months of Maximum income 
Diversion as a condition benefit for initial assistance before Maximum for initial 
State program of eligibility sanction (%)a first time limit benefit (%) eligibility (%)
Alabama No No 50 60 15 18
Alaska Yes Yes 40 60 50 80
Arizona Yes No 25 60 24 40
Arkansas Yes Yes 100 24 14 19
California Yesb No 19 60 49 80
Colorado Yesc No 25 60 24 35
Connecticut Yes No 25 21 38 59
Delaware Yes No 100 36 23 29
D.C. Yes Yes 21 — 29 40
Florida Yes No 100 48 21 27
Georgia Yes Yes 25 48 19 35
Hawaii Yes No 100 60 38 107
Idaho Yes Yes 100 24 21 44
Illinois Yes Yes 50 60 27 33
Indiana No No 100 24 20 26
Iowa Yes No 100 60 29 72
Kansas No No 100 60 29 35
Kentucky Yes No 33 60 18 62
Louisiana Nod Yes 100 24 16 25
Maine Yes No 46 — 33 70
Maryland Yes Yes 100 60 39 48
Massachusetts No No 0 24 43 49
Michigan Yes No 100 48 33 55
Minnesota Yes Yes 17 60 36 76
Mississippi No Yes 100 60 12 31
Missouri No Yes 25 60 20 38
Montana No No 20 60 32 48
Nebraska No No 100 60 25 58
Nevada No Yes 100 24 26 94
New Hampshire Yes No 11 60 43 53
New Jersey Yes Yes 33 60 29 43
New Mexico Yes No 25 60 30 69
New York Yes Yes 33 — 47 53
North Carolina Yes Yes 100 24 19 46
North Dakota Yes Yes 40 60 33 85
Ohio No No 100 36 28 67
Oklahoma Yes No 100 60 20 56
Oregon No Noe 28 60 35 42
Pennsylvania Yes Yes 22f 60 27 34
TABLE 2. A Snapshot of State TANF Policies, July 2008
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Rhode Island Yes No 19 60 38 87
South Carolina No Yes 100 24 18 49
South Dakota Yes No 0 60 37 52
Tennessee Yes No 100 60 13 90
Texas Yes No 100 12, 24, or 36g 17 27
Utah Yes No 21 36 32 46
Vermont Yes Yes 12 — 44 72
Virginia Yes No 100 24 22 100
Washington Yes No 40 — 38 77
West Virginia Yes No 33 60 23 39
Wisconsin Yes Yes Variesh 60 43 115
Wyoming No No 100 60 23 37
TABLE 2.    (continued)
Source: The Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database, funded by DHHS/ACF and DHHS/ASPE, http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/WDRWelcome.cfm.
— = data not available
Notes: The policies in this table reflect the rules affecting the majority of the caseload in each state. Where applicable, rules for a family of three are presented. The maximum benefit and eligibility
thresholds are shown as a percentage of the federal poverty level.
a. We assume that at the time the sanction is applied, the family is receiving the maximum benefit for a family of three.
b. Counties have the option to vary their diversion programs. These policies refer to Los Angeles County.
c. Counties have the option to vary their diversion programs. These policies refer to Denver County.
d. Although it still exists in the law, Louisiana’s diversion program has not received funding since September 2002 and is not included in this table.
e. Job search is not an eligibility requirement but many applicants will be assigned to job search.
f. This sanction applies to noncompliance that occurs during the first 24 months of assistance.
g. The time limit varies depending on a recipient’s level of education and previous work experience.
h. The amount of the sanction depends on the number of hours the recipient has not participated. The sanction is equal to the minimum wage times the number of hours of nonparticipation.
Job search Reduction in Months of Maximum income 
Diversion as a condition benefit for initial assistance before Maximum for initial 
State program of eligibility sanction (%)a first time limit benefit (%) eligibility (%)
strategies can include one-time emergency assis-
tance payments or job search requirements.
Families may also be ineligible due to sanc-
tions and benefit time limits. Nearly half of states
(22) now sanction families the first time they fail
to meet participation requirements. The processes
by which sanctions are applied and benefits are
reinstated vary considerably across states and even
across local offices within states. Nonetheless, the
pervasiveness of strict sanctions indicates states’
tough approach to work participation. Some
families do not receive benefits because they have
reached a time limit or choose to reserve their eli-
gibility time for a period of desperation.2
In a sharp contrast to TANF’s predecessor,
AFDC, the majority (70 percent) of federal and
state TANF funds now pay for nonassistance ser-
vices, such as subsidized child care, child welfare,
and nonrecurring emergency assistance. In 1996,
AFDC provided $24.6 billion in cash assistance,
compared with $8.6 billion in 2008.3 After
adjusting for inflation, the drop represents a 
72 percent real decline.
Responses to DRA requirements. The Deficit
Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 reauthorized the
original TANF program after several years of
debate. DRA implemented much stricter work
participation rules. It raised the effective work
participation rate, increased the share of partici-
pants subject to work requirements, limited the
activities that could be counted as work, pre-
scribed hours that could be spent doing certain
work activities, and required states to verify work
activities for each adult beneficiary.4
Roundtable participants working in
Minnesota, Texas, and Wisconsin, as well as rep-
resentatives from national organizations, con-
firmed that the time they spent verifying work
activities detracted from qualifying families for
benefits and limited their ability to connect fami-
lies to needed services. And the strict focus on
work verification has distracted states from help-
ing the hard to employ.
Others noted that the DRA rules led some
states to shield families from work requirements by
funding their benefits through solely state-funded
An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies
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programs. Most commonly, two-parent families
have been moved into solely state-funded programs
because states have difficulty meeting the separate
90 percent participation rate for these families.
While many participants cited the effects of
the DRA, others noted that the policy changes
that reduced caseloads were in effect before the
DRA. Whatever the reasons, staffing and infra-
structure were so sharply reduced that capacity
to respond to more applications and work par-
ticipation requirements was limited. One partic-
ipant noted that many offices ran on a “skeleton
of TANF staff.” Several roundtable participants
said most states had fewer caseworkers because
of budget cuts and because caseworkers were
attending to soaring enrollment for other pro-
grams such as the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP) and Medicaid/State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).
Participants from several states confirmed
that TANF applicants could not be enrolled
quickly because the eligibility process is so com-
plex and the administrative capacity so limited.
In Texas, TANF is administered by two separate
agencies—welfare and workforce—and clients
have to navigate both agencies. Wisconsin
demands clients search for jobs before applying,
so eligible clients typically cannot receive a check
for six weeks. Some families receive emergency
assistance instead, but this usually provides short-
term relief (the equivalent of one to three months
of benefits) and can only be received once a year.
Funding and federal signals. The nature of 
federal funding has resulted in a narrow focus on
reduced caseloads, changed spending patterns, and
policy decisions that have constrained enrollment.
One participant argued that states are extremely
limited by a block grant that has declined in real
value since 1996. Others criticized states for mov-
ing money out of welfare to shore up state budgets
elsewhere. Still others noted that states may be
moving money to make up for a lack of federal
funds in other programs that serve vulnerable fam-
ilies, such as the Title XX social services block
grant and child welfare programs.
Participants who questioned the large share of
TANF funds going for nonassistance purposes
worried that TANF has lost sight of its goals. Some
participants said that the focus on nonassistance
funding, including child welfare, hinders TANF’s
ability to support families when the economy is
weak and demand for services is rising. While wel-
fare has never provided families enough cash to get
out of poverty, it does much less so today. Other
participants worried that the focus on work and
work supports means that families with some earn-
ings receive more total benefits, while those that
cannot or do not work receive less. This problem is
exacerbated by time limits that disproportionately
affect parents with disabilities.
Several observers commented that both
federal signals and state politics contribute to
reduced welfare caseloads and funding. Caseload
reduction has become “a religion,” in the words 
of one participant, even though smaller caseloads
do not necessarily mean fewer families living in
poverty. Many participants contrasted this federal
and state context to other entitlement programs,
particularly SNAP and Medicaid. SNAP and
Medicaid eligibility and enrollment are far sim-
pler. And with SNAP, states are encouraged to
enroll all eligible families. In contrast, TANF
focuses on accounting and penalties, and states try
to divert eligible families from the rolls. Leaders
see political gain in attacking welfare, not in pro-
tecting it, according to one participant. Americans
expect people to work, and despite TANF’s focus
on work, the program continues to carry a stigma.
The Recession and the 
Stimulus Package
This recession has been the most serious test of
TANF’s role. Can the program successfully help
vulnerable families as need grows? Caseloads are
skyrocketing for other safety net programs, such
as unemployment insurance (UI), SNAP, and
Medicaid/SCHIP. As noted earlier, two-thirds of
survey respondents (16 out of 24) indicated their
TANF caseloads increased by 7 to 50 percent in
2009. Some also reported increasing demands for
child care and emergency assistance. One round-
table participant reported that families in some
states now go on welfare to get child care—
though child care resources were originally
intended to help low-income families achieve
independence from welfare.
Funding. TANF provided a $2 billion con-
tingency fund states could tap when their unem-
ployment rises. Seven states received contingency
funds in fiscal year 2008 and 18 states received
funds in fiscal year 2009. As of July 20, 2009,
only $228 million remained in the contingency
fund (Lower-Basch 2009). It is expected to run
out of money in early 2010.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA) created a new $5 billion TANF
emergency contingency fund that allows states to
apply for basic assistance, nonrecurrent short-
term benefits, and subsidized employment funds.
To qualify, states must document increased
expenditures for these three purposes. The federal
government pays 80 percent of the costs and
states must match the remaining 20 percent. By
November 25, 2009, 26 states were awarded
ARRA funds, accounting for nearly $1 billion of
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this money.5 Twenty states received funds to cover
basic assistance, 12 paid for nonrecurring short-
term assistance, and 12 used the money for subsi-
dized jobs. The ARRA funds are a new federal
signal that spending on the TANF safety net for
families is important.
Consistent with survey respondents, round-
table participants working closely with states noted
the importance of these emergency funds. One par-
ticipant noted that the funds sent a new message to
the welfare agency and its partners: basic assistance
to low-income families is important and a new sub-
sidized employment program is potentially valu-
able. Most states face huge budget gaps and expect
2010 to be worse. The fear is that emergency funds
will run out and states will need to choose which
programs to continue. The two-year time limit on
ARRA emergency funding also limits states’ desires
to start new subsidized employment programs.
The broader safety net. How does TANF fit
into the broader safety net? As other safety net
programs have made changes, including in
response to the recession, are there lessons that
could shape TANF’s current or future directions?
UI may have reached more families during
the recession, thanks to federal extensions and
state program changes that opened up coverage to
more jobless workers. By doing so, UI may have
helped families that otherwise would have turned
to TANF, therefore keeping welfare caseloads low.
However, several participants were skeptical that
eligibility for UI explains low take-up in the
TANF program. Data from Minnesota indicated
that 80 percent of parents on cash assistance were
working sometime in the two years before apply-
ing for assistance and half were working in the
same quarter in which they applied for assistance.
Despite the widespread recent work connections,
many in Minnesota do not qualify for UI during
periods of unemployment (Affirmative Options
Coalition 2009). Another participant cited a
study concluding that UI does not substitute for
TANF on a large scale and that nonmonetary rea-
sons for disqualifying low-wage workers continue
to exclude far too many from UI benefits
(Rangarajan and Razafindrakoto 2004).
Participants also noted the importance of
other Department of Labor programs for low-
wage adults and TANF recipients. The Workforce
Investment Act (WIA) that funds many one-stop
job centers across the country does not have
sufficient funding for all who need services.
Consequently, these offices tend to focus on the
most job-ready and therefore most likely to suc-
ceed (Zedlewski, Holcomb, and Loprest 2007).
Many TANF recipients are hard to employ, but
adults with significant barriers to employment
typically are not served by the WIA, even if they
are seeking work. Participants agreed that the
WIA needs restructuring, not merely tinkering.
Lessons for Reauthorization
What should TANF’s role be in the future? Most
participants agreed that TANF’s goals should 
be made clear and that performance measures
should be redesigned to gauge how well we are
meeting those goals. Other suggestions for re-
authorization related to funding the program 
and targeting resources.
Program goals. Most agreed that TANF’s goals
need to be more clearly defined and realistic given
its limited resources—it cannot be everything for
everybody. TANF is both a work program and a
program to help destitute families. The challenge
is finding the right balance between those two
goals. Many participants argued that federal
incentives bend strongly toward the work pro-
gram side of TANF’s dual personality.
Other participants focused on TANF’s role in
connecting families to work supports. By connect-
ing families to subsidized child care, nutrition
assistance, and health insurance, TANF helps sta-
bilize families and support those in low-wage jobs.
TANF also acts as a temporary disability
program. Some parents turn to TANF when they
cannot work due to health problems. Yet most
state TANF programs do not have the infrastruc-
ture to provide the right assistance for these fami-
lies. Some states actively pursue SSI benefits for
those with disabilities, but eligibility requires a
disability serious enough to prevent work at any
job. What about those who cannot qualify for
SSI, yet cannot work?
In times of economic distress and high
unemployment, TANF should play a counter-
cyclical role, acting as a safety net for vulnerable
families with children. TANF can provide cash
assistance for families that cannot find work but
do not qualify for UI benefits. Even with the
recent changes in the UI system, many workers
are not eligible for benefits.
Some participants emphasized child develop-
ment as a goal of TANF, particularly its support
for child care. Making child care subsidies—
whether funded through TANF or through other
federal and state programs—more stable and
more supportive of high-quality care would
enhance their ability to achieve child develop-
ment goals. Another participant thought that
TANF policies and resources spent encouraging
marriage and noncustodial-parent involvement
should remain in the mix of strategies.
Participants also talked about state innova-
tion as a goal in itself. Prior to TANF, many states
experimented with new programs to encourage
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work, family formation, and other goals.
Wisconsin’s W-2, for example, emphasized indi-
vidualized self-sufficiency plans and ladders out of
poverty (Wisconsin 2009) and Minnesota’s Family
Investment Program provided an integrated, broad
set of services to stabilize families (Minnesota
2009). While some program elements continue
today, states have lost the incentive to innovate
further. Money is tight, funds for rigorous evalua-
tion are not available, and the current federal per-
formance measures are too constraining. If you
want states to innovate, one participant noted, you
need to give them room to fail.
Learning from other safety net programs,
one participant recommended not a set of more
specific goals, but a very big goal. She felt that
the administration’s commitment to ending child
hunger had contributed to positive changes in the
nutrition programs and thought it worthwhile to
consider a similarly ambitious goal for TANF.
Performance measures. TANF performance
measures have a hand in shaping state programs.
Virtually all participants agreed that TANF’s mea-
surement approach is not well linked to the pro-
gram’s goals and may be counterproductive. The
DRA’s strict work participation measures can lead
states to shield families from requirements they
cannot meet—and may cause states to lose sight
of TANF’s true goals. Participants did not reach
consensus on solutions but suggested a broad
agenda for improving performance measures.
Some participants argued that TANF fails by
measuring the process of helping families, not the
outcome. Others thought that process measures
could work if they were more sophisticated. One
participant suggested moving from pass/fail mea-
sures to a point system identifying ways a family
has stabilized or succeeded. Other participants
argued that measuring work is essential for ser-
vices that encourage work, which eventually helps
recipients escape poverty. One participant ques-
tioned whether states can measure a broader set
of outcomes. Counting work hours, for example,
is fairly straightforward compared with measuring
whether TANF has made a positive difference in
a family’s life. The participant suggested backing
off accountability might be better to inspire
innovation—say, by having states report out-
comes without reward or punishment.
Among those participants who thought that
outcomes could be measured, many would like to
include measures specifically tailored to assess fam-
ily advancement and stability, rather than limit
measurement to caseload reduction and work par-
ticipation. The number of cases tells us nothing
about how well the program is helping families
with job quality, job retention, job advancement,
and income. It also overlooks success outside of
work, such as earning a GED or successfully com-
pleting substance abuse treatment. Alternative per-
formance measures could gauge family stability by
considering family income, poverty reduction, and
improvements in child well-being. Some partici-
pants recommend states evaluate caseworkers’
efforts to work with clients who are not job-ready.
Others noted that TANF’s emergency assis-
tance can help prevent foreclosure and homeless-
ness and thought that this assistance should be
included in states’ performance assessments.
TANF benefits are so low in many states that
families only see enrollment as a last resort.
Participants expressed frustration over the lack of
data on how many families receive emergency
assistance and nonassistance benefits. Some asked
whether states should be held accountable for all
types of TANF spending.
A few participants reflected on ways to design
a measurement approach that could thread these
needles. For example, a portfolio of measures bal-
anced across key goals might help avoid the limits
of a single measure. An emphasis on incentives over
penalties might avoid constraining state innovation.
Broader issues. Other issues addressed by the
1996 TANF legislation could become part of
the reauthorization discussion. The original leg-
islation restricted children’s eligibility for SSI
benefits. It expanded child care funding through
the Child Care Development Fund and encour-
aged states to implement marriage education
programs. Benefit eligibility for immigrants was
a contentious part of the debate. The legislation
also substantially changed the child support
enforcement system. Policymakers may want to
consider how these issues are playing out in
today’s economic and political climate.
Some participants talked about the political
reality of TANF. Even in this recession, Americans
still expect people to work. There is no political
gain for supporting or funding welfare. Despite
TANF’s current focus on work, legislators still
attack the program.
Participants desiring a tighter-knit safety net
talked about establishing minimum TANF stan-
dards on the states, possibly accompanied by addi-
tional funding. For example, an expansion could
follow the ARRA model and limit expenditures to
TANF’s core purposes and goals. Another partici-
pant argued that an inflation adjuster in the
TANF block grant was crucial. These points are
consistent with comments in the Urban Institute
web survey, where 9 out of 24 respondents hoped
that Congress would reconsider the fixed block-
grant funding formula that restricts states’ ability
to respond during periods of high unemployment.
In writing the future of TANF, policymakers
must consider how it has responded to the test of
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this recession. Is the program achieving its goals or
has it gone off course? Reauthorization must begin
by revisiting the goals of this important safety net
program and the evidence about the program’s evo-
lution, accomplishments, and limitations. As the
goals and the evidence are clarified, reauthorization
deliberations can focus on ensuring that states are
given the tools, funding, and flexibility to succeed.
Notes
The authors wish to thank Serena Lei for her excellent editing
assistance.
1. The caseloads shown in figure 1 include those receiving
TANF cash assistance funded through either federal or state
maintenance of effort funds. Individuals in separate state
programs funded with TANF monies are included in the
total. However, some states now assist selected families in
solely state-funded (SSF) programs, financed separately
from TANF, that are not counted in states’ TANF caseloads.
These selected families are often two-parent families that
must meet a higher work participation rate (90 percent) that
states fear they could not reach. Few families are assisted in
SSF programs (Pavetti, Rosenberg, and Derr 2009).
2. One study estimated that 250,000 TANF cases closed due
to time limits between January 1997 and September 2005.
Some of these cases received post–time limit assistance
through state programs (Farrell et al. 2008).
3. Estimate for 1996 from Zedlewski et al. (2002); estimate
for 2008 from Administration for Children and Families,
Office of Family Assistance, “Approved TANF Emergency
Fund Applications by Category,” http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/ofa/tanf/apprTANFemerfund.html, downloaded
November 30, 2009.
4. See Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and Center for
Law and Social Policy (2007) for a detailed description of
these new requirements.
5. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Administration for Children and Families, Office of
Family Assistance, “Approved TANF Emergency Fund
Applications by Category,” http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/ofa/tanf/apprTANFemerfund.html, downloaded
November 30, 2009.
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